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Abstract
Risk decisions often appear unsatisfactory after a calamity has taken place. This holds
even when they are products of systematic risk analysis. Yet, if relevant consider-
ations available to be known pre-accident were adequately taken into account and
safety measures implemented accordingly, nobody seems morally blameworthy. In this
paper, I advance a two-way argument. Firstly, I show how analysis of post-accident
apologizing sheds new light on vexed tensions in ethical assessment of risk imposi-
tions. This amounts to exposing conflicting moral intuitions in risk decisions,
discussing problematic tenets in risk analysis as well as outlining three lines of
arguments that destabilize the very notion of correct risk analysis. The analysis
indicates that bringing different discussions of moral blameworthiness together facil-
itates resolving the tensions. It also calls for further and early-on collaboration
between risk theorists and ethicists in order to carry these insights to risk analysis.
Secondly, I argue that analysis of risk decisions, in part, reveals a discrepancy
between the definitional work done on apology and what is required by ethics.
Virtually every suggestion for the gold standard for apology involves moral blame-
worthiness as a necessary condition. I highlight different kinds of cases in which
nobody is culpable, but an apology can be morally fitting or required. It would be
nonsensical to say that, in these cases, one ought to apologize, but in a disingenuous
manner.
Keywords Apology . Risk analysis .Moral blameworthiness . Calamity . Regret .Moral luck
1 Introduction
When a calamity takes place, measures to contain damage needs to be taken whenever
possible. Afterwards, a post-accident investigation may be undertaken, liabilities will
be assigned, and the affected parties should be compensated to the extent just and
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possible. Sometimes a relevant party states a public apology. This is true of some
companies and their chief executive officers.1 A public apology is also occasionally
stated by government officials, spokeswomen of regulatory authorities, and members
of expert organizations.2
Post-accident apologizing is intuitive. It feels appropriate, many times required. Neverthe-
less, in one sense stating an apology appears puzzling. An apology is at odds with the fact that
many activities (such as production of nuclear power and implementation of a vaccination
scheme) are preceded by risk analysis enforced by laws and administrative practices. In risk
analysis, dangers are identified, assessed, and weighed against each other and against socio-
economic, ethical and political considerations. The aim is then to take effective and propor-
tional safety measures in order to prevent calamities from happening and reduce the risks to an
acceptable level. Let us call correct risk analysis a situation in which relevant considerations
available to be known pre-accident are adequately taken into account and safety measures
implemented accordingly. In correct risk analysis, the relevant parties (i.e. an operator and a
regulatory authority including the related expert organizations) have done their duty. Now, if a
risk nevertheless materializes, neither the operator nor the regulatory agencies appear to be
morally blameworthy. An apology seems not required–at least not in a strict sense.
In this paper, I will first briefly consider different accounts for a post-accident apology.
Most, if not all, real-life cases of post-accident apologies can be explained by incorrect risk
analysis and/or apology without fault-admitting.3 Besides the empirical question of what is
being apologized for, there is a philosophical issue: does a post-accident apology conflict with
correct risk analysis? I will sketch five ways the mismatch between an authentic apology and
correct risk analysis might be resolved. They include mistaken apology, apologizing for
contribution, unavoidable regret, flawed principles of risk analysis, and impossible correct
risk analysis. The analysis draws on several discussions which are interrelated but–at least to
my awareness–have not been considered together in the context of risk analysis. They include
ethics of apology, philosophy of risk, moral luck, decision theoretic principles and distinctions,
agent regret, culpable ignorance, and ethics of emerging technologies.
1 As an example, on their webpage Masataka Shimizu, the president of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO),
spoke on behalf of his company: BOur deepest sorrows go to those people and their families who are suffering from
the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake and tsunami that struck our nation onMarch 11th [2011]. Furthermore,
I deeply apologize for the distress and inconvenience to those residing in the surrounding areas of the power station,
Fukushima Prefecture as well as broader society due to the extensive damage our facilities sustained at Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and the rolling blackouts.^ (TEPCO 2011.)
2 As an example, after an outbreak of narcolepsy linked with the Pandemrix vaccination against pandemic
influenza A/H1N1 (colloquially known as swine flu), Terhi Kilpi, the head of the Department of Vaccination and
Immune Protection of the Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), apologized to the affected
parties (MTV3 2011a). Pekka Puska, the director general of the THL, also expressed his condolences, but
emphasized that the decision to vaccinate was made under the best available information (MTV3 2011b). The
association between the vaccine and narcolepsy was found out and confirmed later. Interestingly, Kilpi has later
indicated that she would not decide differently now as the vaccinations prevented many unnecessary deaths. At
another instance, she stated that the vaccination should maybe not have been given to young people, aged 5 to 20.
3 To avoid misunderstandings, I want to emphasize the following. First, I do not claim to know the real reasons
behind the TEPCO’s or the THL’s apology. The reasons should fall into the three accounts suggested in the
section two. Second, I do not imply that the members of the TEPCO or the THL should not have apologized.
Furthermore, the socio-cultural norms and practices concerning apologizing and asking for forgiveness differ in
Europe and Japan. For an account of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and ethical questions related to the use of
nuclear power more generally, see the editorial and two special issues by Benjamin Hale (2011) in Ethics, Policy
and Environment.
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The tension between an authentic apology and (correct) risk analysis reveals discrepancies
in moral intuitions and precepts, but also more generally vexed issues in theories and practices
of decision-making under outcome uncertainty.4 In particular, risk decisions often appear
unsatisfactory, or they seem much less satisfactory, after a calamity has taken place. This
holds true even when they followed from a systematic risk analysis. My guess is that the
philosophical questions related to apology and risk analysis have gone under the radar because,
at first thought, it seems that there cannot be any reasonable issue here: stating a post-accident
apology in case of correct risk analysis simply does not make sense as nobody is morally
blameworthy. Apologizing presupposes moral blameworthiness. If someone is morally blame-
worthy, then the risk analysis cannot be a correct one and an apology may be in order.
Some simplifications had to be made. I will mainly consider the perspective of an
individual, whereas oftentimes it is collectives who might be held morally responsible. It
may be asked what it means that a collective (such as a company, an agency, or even a state)
apologizes. An authentic apology might not be correctly ascribed to collectives, but only to the
members of those collectives. Only the latter are capable of remorse. In what follows, I have
sidestepped questions related to a collective stating a(n authentic) apology, for example, issues
arising from the fact that although representing the same collective, the persons stating an
apology may often be different from the wrongdoers. These issues are certainly important, but
they remain beyond the present analysis and could not have been satisfactorily dealt with here.
Another related limitation concerns moral blameworthiness. Either it is a representative
individual who apologizes on behalf of a collective for previous (in)actions in which she did or
did not participate, or it is an individual who apologizes for her own failure to fulfill duties
assigned to her within the collective. A reductionist strategy would be to say that in incorrect
risk analysis, there must be at least one individual who is morally blameworthy for her
(in)actions. However, it remains a matter of debate whether or not collective responsibility is
reducible to individual responsibility. Two sets of reasons cast doubt on the possibility of a
simple reduction, at least in some situations. Firstly, social interaction gives at times rise to
outcomes that no one directly caused or intended. Tragedy of the commons, causal
overdetermination and decision-making paradoxes (such as voting paradoxes) undermine the
straightforward ascription of responsibility to individuals. Secondly, it may be difficult or
impossible to track an individual’s exact causal role in complex social endeavors.
2 Three Accounts of Post-Accident Apology
Post-accident apologies may be neatly subsumed under three explanations. The first one is the
most straightforward: incorrect risk analysis accounts for a post-accident apology. Because of a
flaw in risk analysis and the resulting moral blameworthiness, there is nothing problematic in
stating an apology. As Sven Ove Hansson (2007, p. 149) notes, B[o]nly rarely would it be
appropriate to say that enough had been done to prevent the accident and that nothing should
have been done differently .^ Taking lessons from accidents, whenever possible, makes good
sense, but stating an apology may still seem odd. Two kinds of cases in which something new
4 By outcome uncertainty, I refer to a situation in which the outcome of an (in)action is unknown for a fact
beforehand. When not specified, I use the term ‘risk’ colloquially in this paper by simply referring to an
undesirable outcome that may or may not occur. For different meanings of the term ‘risk’, see e.g.
Hansson 2013, esp. pp. 7–11.
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about risks is learned as a result of an accident need to be distinguished. New information
gained can be such that it should have been considered in correct risk analysis. Alternatively,
new information may require changes in risk analysis in the future (for a discussion on learning
from accidents, see e.g. Lindberg et al. 2010). It is reasonable to assume that sometimes this
information cannot be achieved in principle or without an unreasonable cost pre-accident. In
the latter case, stating an apology seems not required.
The second explanation of post-accident apologizing amounts to an apology without fault-
admitting.5 In practice, it is not seldom that stating an apology and admitting moral blame-
worthiness come apart. A post-accident apology may be an instance of expression of sympathy
(i.e. Bwe are sorry that X happened^), not of a fault-admitting apology (Bwe are sorry that our
[in]actions contributed to harming you in an unacceptable and morally blameworthy way^). I
will call the latter an authentic apology. An (inauthentic) apology can be stated for reasons
other than fault-admitting both when incorrect risk analysis was made and when correct risk
analysis was made, however rare the latter case.
Stating a public apology can serve several purposes. It may be good public relations for a
collective because it gives an impression to stakeholders and the general public that the
collective is a morally-conscious actor who shows respect to the affected parties, that it tries
to normalize the situation or relationship, and that it is committed to acting differently in the
future. A strategic apology may nevertheless come with a price. Whatever the real reasons
behind it, stating an apology easily gives an impression that something wrong was done. It
might be taken as an indication of fault-admitting and taking responsibility.6 So there can also
be reasons not to apologize even in cases where one knows that one’s actions were faulty. This
is the case when uncertainties about legal liabilities and compensations exist. After the Gulf of
Mexico oil spill in 2010, BP admitted responsibility only after a while.
The picture is further complicated by a dynamic between admitting blameworthiness and
explaining what happened that works towards the opposite direction. Providing a full account
of one’s actions may blur the moral responsibility. As explicated by Bovens (2008, p. 229):
[w]e expect the offender to provide an account of the wrongdoing–what is it that brought
her to act in the way she did? Now this account may contain mitigating excuses and
should be as complete as possible. But there is a fine line between telling the story
extremely well and making exculpatory excuses. The mitigating excuses in a well-told
story may add up and come to sound like an exculpatory excuse.
This is no doubt sometimes intentionally exploited in practice, but it also raises a more
fundamental question as to the extent to which an agent can be morally blameworthy. A full
account of any action normally refers to causes that remain outside one’s direct control. I will
return to this later (esp. in terms of foreseeability in sections 4.2 and 4.3).
The third account is a (hypothetical) situation in which an authentic apology is stated in
case of correct risk analysis. It fires up a host of philosophical questions related to ethics of
risk-imposition. Again, two cases should be distinguished. In the first one, all actions required
by laws, regulations and guidelines are fulfilled by relevant parties. When so, nobody is legally
5 An account of apologizing underlying this explanation must maintain that apologizing does not imply that the
apologizer admits to be morally blameworthy. Cf. section 3.1.
6 Legal scholars have discussed the potential benefits and risks of apologizing in law cases. For an empirical
exploration of the ways in which apologies affect settlement decision-making, see Robbennolt 2003.
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liable (for the risk decisions). In the second one, risk analysis is undertaken in such a way that
nobody is to blame, morally speaking. Abiding by the current laws and regulations does not
ensure correct risk analysis. They may require insufficient risk assessment, management and/or
communication.
3 Does a Post-Accident Apology Conflict with Correct Risk Analysis?
The question whether or not a post-accident apology conflicts with correct risk analysis hinges
on two incompatible intuitions. On the one hand, an apology by a causally responsible party
feels appropriate after a calamity has taken place. On the other hand, there seems to be no
reason to apologize, if there was no fault or failure in risk analysis. Both intuitions carry prima
facie plausibility. There are at least five ways the mismatch might be resolved. Let us next
consider each of them in turn.
3.1 Mistaken Apology
The apology may be mistaken. There is, consequently, no inconsistency between correct risk
analysis and stating a post-accident apology. An authentic apology is typically taken to
presuppose at least two things: that an agent has contributed to (the occurrence of) something
and that she takes herself to be morally blameworthy for doing that. She should have known
better and she feels it. What is important to note here is that virtually every analysis of apology
takes moral blameworthiness to be a necessary condition for an authentic apology. Here are
three examples:
Bit is intrinsic to a genuine apology that one takes oneself to be in the wrong^ (Davis
2002, p. 169)
BFor a genuine apology, it is not sufficient that the offender admit[s] that her action
turned out badly–she must also recognize her culpability^ (Bovens 2008, p. 221)
A categorical apology requires acceptance of blame, admitting both causation and
wrongdoing (Smith 2008, esp. Ch. 2).7
The first suggestion proceeds from this to claim that what is required is that she considers
herself to be morally blameworthy, not that she is morally blameworthy. So a mistake about
one’s blameworthiness might dispel the mismatch between an authentic apology and correct
risk analysis.
The trick here, however, is that whether or not an authentic apology presupposes actual
moral blameworthiness is unclear and calls for an argument. It seems intuitive that an
apologizer need not only think that she is morally blameworthy, but should also have an idea
7 Bovens (2008) also uses the phrase ‘authentic apology’. Other terms employed in the relevant
literature include, for example, ‘genuine apology’, ‘consummate apology’ and ‘categorical apology’.
Different authors suggest slightly different conditions for this gold standard for an apology. Bovens
argues that an authentic apology involves a cognitive, an affective, a conative, and an attitudinal
component. Here I am concerned only with two necessary conditions for authentic apology. For an
analytic approach to apology, see also Davis 2002; Smith 2008.
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of what exactly makes her actions transgressive. This may make making the mistake harder
and rarer, but admittedly one can also be mistaken about the reasons that make an action
morally blameworthy. Furthermore, it might not be reasonable to accept an apology if the
apologizer is not morally blameworthy, but only thinks so. Instead of accepting the apology,
reconciliation could require explaining to the apologizer why there was no transgression in the
first place.
This said, in practice it may be relatively common that one is uncertain about whether or not
she is morally blameworthy. In some cases this uncertainty may be irreducible by careful
reflection, communication and finding out the facts of the situation. Under such uncertainty,
one might want to err on the side of caution and apologize. Balancing is required, however, as
an excessive precautionary apologizing could prove counterproductive by inflating the moral
gravity of the practice itself.
3.2 Contributory Apology, Moral Remainder, and Pragmatic Moral Reasons
The oddity of apologizing for correct risk analysis might be avoided by invoking a looser
concept of apology. One suggestion consists of dropping off the second condition. In partic-
ular, it is not necessary that one is and takes herself to be morally blameworthy. Contributing to
an unfortunate course of actions and events is sufficient for an apology. In a sense, Brooke
Natalie Barnum-Roberts (2011) goes even further when arguing that there are cases in which
apologizing without regret makes good sense. (Here I assume that one might regret choices for
which she is not morally blameworthy as in case of outcome regret explained below.) In her
view, someone can be genuinely sorry for her (in)actions without wishing that she had done
differently.
This looser understanding of an apology as a mere contributory apology may be common in
practice. However, the question is not what is being apologized for, but what should be
apologized for. If a mere contribution were sufficient for genuinely apologizing, then it would
be fitting to apologize for being part of an unfortunate course of events even when not
contributing to those events was impossible for an agent or otherwise morally excusable for
her.
Yet the issue is not that simple. BernardWilliams explains cases–specifically, a careful lorry
driver who runs over a child–in which one is causally responsible for harm to others but not
morally blameworthy as follows: Bthere is something special about his relation to this
happening, something which cannot merely be eliminated by the consideration that it is not
his fault^ (Williams 1981, p. 28). The driver might well entertain thoughts like BI could have
prevented this from happening^ and he could wish he acted differently despite the fact that he
knows not to be morally blameworthy for what happened. It seems that an apology, for
example, to the parents whose child was killed in the accident could be in order here. Not
apologizing when he later by-no-plan meets them would surely be bad taste. Avirtuous person
apologized in this kind of situation. There might be a (prima facie) duty to apologize.
Interestingly, this apology encompasses many of the common characteristics of the gold
standard for apology. The driver should, for example, show respect and sympathy for the loss
and suffering caused by the accident. The apology also needs to be accompanied by an attitude
of humility. As virtually every suggestion for the standard involves moral blameworthiness as
a necessary condition, the lorry driver example reveals a tension between the definitional work
done and what is required by ethics. It would be nonsensical to say that the driver should
apologize, but in an insincere, inauthentic or disingenuous manner.
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One way to put the conclusion from the lorry driver case is that an apology may be fitting
when one is not morally blameworthy, but that there is a moral remainder (or a residual
obligation, to use a term coined by Williams). Sometimes there are competing valid moral
reasons to choose mutually exclusive options, but a right course of action nonetheless. Bovens
(2008) provides an example in which one misses an appointment with a friend because his
child suddenly gets ill. Besides breaking a promise by not doing what was agreed, there is also
some inconvenience–although only minor–caused to the friend. Despite these two moral
Bcosts^, staying at home with the child is what one should do, all things considered. One
may still owe the friend a notice, which amounts to a moral remainder.8
Bovens considers it to be somewhat plausible that one should apologize in his example, but
suggests that, alternatively, it might be that what one owes to the friend Bis an expression of
regret for having been placed in this choice situation and for the harmful consequences of (…)
[one’s] actions^ (Bovens 2008, p. 224). Regret here is concerned with the situation in which
one is involved and to which one has contributed: causing harm to another person. One does
not wish she had chosen differently, nor is there moral blameworthiness.
An apology may relate to moral remainder in two ways. Firstly, it could be considered that
an apology in itself fulfills the remainder. According to Sven Ove Hansson and Martin
Peterson (2001, p. 159), one has B(at least) a residual obligation to sincerely apologise^ in
cases corresponding to the Boven’s example above. Secondly, an apology could be required if
one failed to do what is required by a moral remainder. If one informs the friend that one
cannot make it to the appointment and explains the situation, then there seems to be no room
for an authentic apology besides. The moral remainder has been fulfilled. If it was not fulfilled,
an apology might be required. It is noteworthy that in this case an apology is only indirectly
concerned with the original decision.
Similar considerations may be invoked in case of tragic choices. They comprise situations
in which there appears not to be a morally right course of action at all as all the available
choices are catastrophic, morally speaking, and/or the compelling moral claims are not
meaningfully comparable with each other (for a discussion of tragic choices when probabilities
are involved, see Rivera-López 2008; for analysis of hard and tragic choices, see Tessman
2017).9 Whenever a (risk) decision presents a tragic choice, apologizing, explaining the
situation to the ones harmed (when possible) and expressing respect and sympathy for their
suffering can be fitting. But again, this does not amount to an authentic apology–strictly
speaking.
Lastly, it could be argued that pragmatic moral reasons warrant apologizing in case of
correct risk analysis. It is plausible, for example, that (the general practice of) apologizing
raises moral Bclimate^ in society, i.e. fostering and resulting in more responsible behavior by
oneself and others in the future. In consequentialist ethics or reasoning, the valuable
8 To consider this in the context of risk decisions: at times, one needs to choose a lesser evil, meaning inducing
the possibility of significant harm to some in order to prevent a greater harm to many. This is the case, for
example, in vaccination schemes. While some people will suffer side effects, everybody receives the benefit of
population immunity. The moral remainder might imply attempting to identify the individuals and subpopula-
tions prone to the side effects and excluding them from the program as well as alleviating the side effects when
they occur.
9 Hard choices refer to cases in which there are competing valid moral reasons to choose mutually exclusive
options, but a right course of action all things considered nonetheless (the missing-an-appointment case discussed
above presents an example of a hard choice). The most commonly presented example of a tragic choice is the one
with which Sophie is confronted at a Nazi concentration camp in the novel Sophie’s Choice. One of her two kids
can be spared, but only if she chooses which one to save.
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consequences arising from apologizing could make stating an apology a moral duty. Taken to
its extreme this obligation is not dependent on (although it might in practice be associated
with) whether or not one has contributed to a moral wrong or even whether there is a moral
wrong in the first place. In any case, as far as there is no moral blameworthiness involved, this
morally motivated apology cannot qualify as an authentic one.
3.3 Regret and Apology
Regret often seems an unavoidable possibility in decision-making under outcome uncertainty.
This is because feelings and emotions are only partially reason-responsive. So it is possible to
regret a decision one made even if she believes that the decision was the best possible or a
morally right one. Sometimes all the options are calamitous (as is the situation in tragic
choices). At other times, a highly improbable bad thing happens. Regret may also arise in
response to information that was not at hand at the time of a decision. One might often feel that
she should have found out more information before making a decision, but regret (when not
reason-responsive) may also ensue in cases where the relevant information became available
only after the risk decision.
Even if feelings and emotions were fully responsive to (rational) reasons, one might regret
her undertakings because her preferences and values change over time. Noteworthy is that
some principles in decision theory are actually based on the notion of regret. The principle of
minimax regret says that a decision-maker should choose an option that is associated with the
lowest level of maximal regret. This presupposes that some amount of regret may follow even
in the case of a rational decision. In sum, regret may follow in case of correct risk analysis
depending on how things turn out. As regret accounts for an authentic apology, the oddity of
post-accident apologizing disappears.
This third suggestion also faces a number of problems. Firstly, the denial of regret-free
alternatives can be questioned. Some philosophers have insisted that one should act in a way
that avoids self-blame and remorse. John Rawls (1972, p. 422), for instance, suggests that Ba
rational individual is always to act so that he need never blame himself no matter how things
finally transpire^.10 Needless to say, the absence of self-blame does not mean that the
individual could not be sad about the suffering of others caused by her actions and express
genuine pity and sorrow.
Secondly, the straightforward connection drawn between regret and an apology is
problematic. Paul Davis (2002) argues that an authentic apology involves substantially more
than regret about an offence caused by one’s behavior. Furthermore, while regret is necessary
for being genuinely sorry seems to be the received wisdom, merely a specific kind of regret is
relevant. Only when an individual has contributed to something harmful or unacceptable, she
wishes that she had not contributed to that and does so for moral reasons as in cases of remorse
and repentance, an apology is in order.11 Other forms of regret are irrelevant to an authentic
apology.
10 Cf. I. L. Humberstone (1980) argues that the fact that one knows beforehand that she will regret an
action, i.e. that she wishes that she would have done differently, in itself is not a good reason for
refraining from the action in question.
11 For an analytic approach to regret, see Oksenberg Rorty 1980. According to Williams (1981, p. 27), wishing
that one had acted differently is a necessary condition for regret. Rorty (1980, p. 495) disagrees. As noted,
Barnum-Roberts (2011) argues that against the received wisdom. In her view, regret is not even a necessary
condition for being genuinely sorry.
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If regret is irrational in a sense that an individual knows that a right decision was made but
still feels it, she has no reason to apologize despite, or besides, the (not-morally-relevant) fact
that apologizing might make her feel better (on rationality of regret, see e.g. Bittner 1992).12 A
relevant distinction is that an agent may feel outcome regret driven by a comparison of the
realized outcome with some reference point (for example, with an imagined, expected or
known outcome of an unchosen alternative), even if she does not feel process regret. The latter
refers to the evaluation of whether or not the decision procedure was justified. If it was so, then
she thinks the decision was a right one and would decide in the same way again, if the
opportunity appeared, irrespective of the actual consequences in particular cases.
3.4 Flawed Principles of Risk Analysis
A fourth suggestion is that a post-accident apology does not conflict with correct risk analysis
because the theoretical basis of risk analysis is unsatisfactory from an ethical point of view. In
particular, its underlying principles are not stable against the occurrence of calamities. Risk
analysis resembles the application of the principle of maximizing expected utility. The latter
proves unsatisfactory after-the-fact, that is, when a calamity–the possibility of which was
included in the calculation–has taken place. Hansson (2007) points to typical lines of post-
accident argumentation. Accidents are not defended as being the necessary bad of a strategy
that is the best option in the (very or infinitely) long run. When did a collective causally
responsible for a calamity assert that it was acceptable and only to be counted as part of utility
maximization? A related point is that
accident investigation boards are instructed to answer the questions BWhat happened?
Why did it happen? How can a similar event be avoided?^, not the question BWas the
accident defensible in an expected utility calculation?^ (Ibid., pp. 146–7.)
It is true that the principle of maximizing expected utility seems not satisfactory as a sole
ethical precept. A major defect is that its prescriptions occasionally go against basic moral
intuitions, for example, by infringing basic rights, conflicting with people’s sense of fairness,
and paying insufficient attention to catastrophic small probability events (for problems in
maximizing expected utility, see e.g. Hansson 2013, esp. pp. 26–8). One possible solution here
would be to combine the principle with other ethical precepts (such as basic rights, justice and
precaution).
It is often stated that common forms of risk analysis are based on consequentialist reasoning
and, specifically, maximizing expected utility (e.g. Hansson 2013, p. 26). This means that the
same problems would color risk analysis as well (as the above-version of the suggestion
presumes). However, it seems mainly to be the two-dimensional conception of risk as
consisting of a quantified damage (disutility) and its probability that is shared. The balancing
of different risks against each other and against political, socio-economic and ethical consid-
erations in risk management does not (necessarily) coincide with choosing an option with the
highest expected utility. Here other ethical precepts can well be taken into account.
Moreover, risk analysis can reflect what is required by ethics better or worse. There is no
necessary link between ethical norms of harm (and risk) avoidance, basic rights, autonomy,
justice, etc. on the one hand, and the chosen level of acceptable risk and risk mitigation
12 In many consequentialist approaches feeling better counts as a morally relevant fact.
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measures taken in risk management on the other. A corollary is that risk analysis may be
undertaken in accordance with its set aims and procedures, but that the risk decisions made still
give rise to moral blameworthiness.
The fact that risk decisions often seem unsatisfactory–or much less satisfactory–after-the-
fact does not imply that these decisions would be ethically faulty as well. What might be called
blame mania is the idea that there must be somebody responsible and blameworthy for
basically any calamity that takes place. Even if it is a natural catastrophe, somebody must
have underestimated the risk and carried out insufficient alarms and preventative measures.13
This may at times be the case, but generally speaking blame mania presents an unreasonable
position and attitude. Some calamities take place however good the risk analysis. Related to
this is the observation that expectations towards institutions’ capability of handling risks are
typically higher than those of individuals. At times, these expectations are simply too high to
be reasonable.
A quick response to the suggestion that risk analysis is based on flawed principles is that the
actual practices with their problematic underlying principles amount to incorrect risk analysis.
Is it not just that these practices do not yield to correct risk analysis, not that correct risk
analysis is impossible in a way that it is also satisfactory after the fact?
4 Is Correct Risk Analysis a Chimera?
If correct risk analysis was impossible, then there would be no weirdness in a post-accident
apologizing. This suggestion may take at least three forms.
4.1 Apples and Oranges
Weighing between different kinds of risks (e.g. those of species loss versus economic
recession) and between risks and benefits (e.g. probable increase in mortality versus faster
transportation) in a justified manner is not only extremely challenging, but in some cases it
may be impossible (see e.g. Rescher 1983, esp. pp. 20–6). If so, correct risk analysis proves to
be a chimera.
In a sense apologizing may still remain odd even if correct risk analysis was impossible.
This is the case when everything that could have reasonably been taken into consideration and
done was, in fact, taken into consideration and done. Furthermore, in the most common cases
incomparability (or incommensurability) is not about risks in itself, but about different values
and disvalues. There is no straightforward and commonly agreed-on way to weigh and balance
between the disvalue of species loss and economic recession, nor between increase in mortality
and faster transportation.
A proponent of this line of argumentation is thus faced with a choice. She may admit that
finding an ethically right or acceptable choice is impossible even when outcomes of different
actions are known for a fact (and continue arguing that this also holds under outcome
uncertainty, which in turn would make correct risk analysis impossible at least in some cases).
Alternatively, she could try to show a special nature of the context of outcome uncertainty (i.e.
13 For a discussion on a law case where four scientists, two engineers and a government official were prosecuted
for having carried out insufficient analysis of risk and provided false reassurances to the general public as part of
risk communication, see Cartlidge 2012.
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how incomparability is especially problematic in this context). Accepting the former is painful
as the problems are shared with any evaluative analysis of consequences. The latter remains to
be done.14
4.2 The Act-Outcome Link Argument and Intrinsic Failure
Another line of argument draws on the act-outcome link. Thomas Nagel explains that
[i]n many cases of difficult choice the outcome cannot be foreseen with certainty. One
kind of assessment of the choice is possible in advance, but another kind must await the
outcome, because the outcome determines what has been done. The same degree of
culpability or estimability in intention, motive, or concern is compatible with a wide
range of judgments, positive or negative, depending on what happened beyond the point
of decision. The mens rea which could have existed in the absence of any consequences
does not exhaust the grounds of moral judgment. Actual results influence culpability or
esteem in a large class of unquestionably ethical cases ranging from negligence through
political choice. (Nagel 1993, p. 452.)15
The act-outcome link argument may take two forms. The first one says that the outcome of an
action, at least, partly determines its ethical verdict. The second one says that the outcome of
an act, not only the intention or motive of an agent performing it, determines partly what has
been done, and that ethical appraisal of choices is dependent on what actually has been done.
In both cases, knowledge about the probabilities of different possible outcomes is not enough.
Pre-accident risk analysis is necessarily incomplete from an ethical point of view (and,
perhaps, it is also morally indeterminate). It makes good sense to apologize when after-the-
fact ethical appraisal uncovers a fault.
Notwithstanding, it is tempting to think that in light of what can be known pre-accident
some decision that would make moral reproach unsuitable no matter how things turn out must
be possible (ibid., esp. p. 452). Hansson (2007, 2013, pp. 62–71) suggests a strategy called
hypothetical retrospection in which a decision is evaluated under the assumption that one of
the branches of possible future developments has materialized. Decision alternatives obviously
need to be evaluated under each of the identified possible developments. By Italics, I want to
point that there may well be unexpected outcomes and they might trigger regret. This is not a
problem for Hansson, however, as he emphasizes the difference between regret and moral
acceptability (or defensibility). BRegret is a psychological reaction, not an argued moral
standpoint^ (Hansson 2013, p. 64). Instead of trying simply to avoid regret, one should ensure
that however things turn out, the post-fact evaluation would not conclude that a decision was
morally wrong.
As the previous suggestions, the act-outcome link arguments also come with a Bcost^. In an
extreme form the arguments would expel the action-guiding function of ethics when the
outcome of an (in)action is not known for a fact. Moreover, if the outcome of an action alone
determined (a great part of) a full ethical appraisal, after-the-fact analysis of past risky choices
14 Of course, this is not to say that no work on this area has been done. For early discussions on the problems that
outcome uncertainty poses to ethics, see Nozick 1974; Altham 1983.
15 Related to this, Jonathan Bennett (1995) provides a subtle analysis of the distinction between the consequences
of an act and the act itself (an inner act of pure will assessed by motive and intention, in Nagel’s terms) and argues
for dropping the latter concept entirely.
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would reveal unbearable consequences. Under this view, taking a 99,99% chance of causing a
calamity may well be the right choice when the outcome is not obtained (even if there were
other options with lesser risks available).
It has been suggested that the way in which a particular outcome comes about as a
result of a choice is relevant to its justifiability. Williams (1981, pp. 23–7) distin-
guishes between extrinsic and intrinsic luck and argues that it matters for the
retrospective (un)justifiability of an action how intrinsic the cause of a failure is to
the action’s intended outcome. To use Williams’ famous example in a slightly
modified form: if Gauguin’s feasible project to become a famous painter was foiled
by his being accidentally killed, this would not unjustify his decision to dedicate his
life to art. On the other hand, B[w]ith an intrinsic failure, the project which generated
the decision is revealed as an empty thing, incapable of grounding the agent’s life^
(ibid., p. 36). This would be the case if Gauguin, after pursuing a life as an artist,
found out that he was not an exceptionally talented painter who could produce
valuable artwork.
While in Williams’ view both intrinsic and extrinsic luck are necessary for success and
retrospective justification, it is only an intrinsic failure that could prove a decision unjustified.
He admits that even if Gauguin would find his choice to pursue his art and leave his family
justified in case of success, this Bneed not provide him with any way of justifying himself to
others, or at least to all others^ (ibid., p. 23). This brings out the question as to the extent to
which this particular kind of justifiability has to do with moral defensibility and ethics (this is
also where Williams and Nagel disagree). One may pursue disastrous projects, ethically
speaking, and have both intrinsic and extrinsic luck in them. Furthermore, while Gauguin
could not know for sure whether he would have it in himself what is required to become a
great artist, it matters a great deal to the justification–both ethical and rational–what kind of
evidence he possessed at the time of the decision. If he did not pursue art at all before making
the decision and merely had a hunch that he then followed, many would be inclined to think
that despite success, his decision to pursue art was unjustified.
What would count as an intrinsic failure in the context of risk analysis? It might amount to
founding the risk assessment on wrong background assumptions, missing possible harmful
consequences, choosing wrongly the level of acceptable risk, undertaking insufficient risk
management actions or failures in responsible risk communication. In their report on risk
governance deficits, the International Risk Governance Council (2009) states that Bno matter
how good an early warning system is, or how thoroughly risk assessments are conducted, it is
important to acknowledge that risk assessment relies on what, conceivably, could go wrong^.
Whether or not there is an intrinsic failure in risk assessment may be found out only
afterwards. If it turns out that there was such a failure, it would not be a case of correct risk
analysis. This illustrates how the first explanation discussed in the section two (i.e. incorrect
risk analysis) proves too simplified. In case of an intrinsic failure, risk analysis–as it was
conducted–could not have fulfilled its very aims. It would certainly be a case for revising risk
analysis (or its objectives); yet, it remains debatable whether the analysts would be morally
blameworthy.16
16 Going beyond a strict reading of ‘intrinsic failure’ (which implies impossibility of the project success that
cannot be foreseen), developing further these ideas in the context risk analysis could benefit from discussion on
culpable ignorance. For discussion, see e.g. Smith 1983; see also Zimmerman 2008.
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4.3 Luck-Component of Risk, Uncontrollability, and Apology
A closely related line of argument draws on the luck-component of a risk. In the case of a
decision-theoretic risk, there is something that is known (i.e. the magnitude and scope of
damage as well as its probability) and something that remains not known (whether or not the
damage actualizes in a particular case) (see Luce and Raiffa 1957).17 Owing to the latter, any
risk entails a luck-component that refers to the part of a danger for which there is neither
controllability nor foreseeability. A conventional wisdom says that to the extent there are
things beyond one’s control one cannot be morally blameworthy. As Nagel puts it,
[p]rior to reflection it is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for
what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control. Such judgment
is different from the evaluation of something as a good or bad thing, or state of affairs.
(…) So a clear absence of control, produced by involuntary movement, physical force,
or ignorance of the circumstances, excuses what is done from moral judgment.
(Nagel 1993, p. 450.)
Against this, it is known from the classical examples of moral luck that people are often treated
as (if they were) responsible for character traits, situations and outcomes over which they lack
control. Nagel continues,
[w]here a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his
control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it
can be called moral luck (ibid.; for another seminal discussion on moral luck, see
Williams 1981, Ch. 2; see also Dickenson 2003; Levy 2011).
According to a common classification, this luck–which may be good or bad–can be concerned
with one’s inclinations, capacities and temperament (constitutive luck), the kinds of problems
and situations one faces (circumstantial luck), how one is determined by antecedent circum-
stances (causal luck), and how one’s actions and projects turn out (resultant luck). Risk
decisions pertain mainly, but not solely, to resultant luck (here I sidestep differences in the
appetite for risk-taking or risk-avoidance which could be interpreted as constitutive luck).
Now, to sum up, the luck-component of risk argument says that when correct risk analysis has
been made, but things end up badly (by bad resultant luck), apologizing is fitting.
This argument suffers from the following ailments. Firstly, it does not make sense to
apologize, ethically speaking, or state an authentic apology for the luck-component of a risk
given that reducing it by more extensive risk assessment was not morally required. Secondly,
even if the debate on moral luck shows that people are often being held responsible for things
that are beyond their control, this does not make it reasonable, nor an authentic apology
required, provided that we are not willing to give up the conventional wisdom. This holds even
when admitting that to some extent the conventional wisdom is naïve as under closer scrutiny,
Bwhether we succeed or fail in what we try to do nearly always depends to some extent on
factors beyond our control^ (Nagel 1993, p. 450). There is admittedly a Bcost^ related to this
position (that I continue to hold) in a sense that some uncontrollable things are exempted from
moral evaluation and others not, while it is difficult to spell out justification for their difference.
17 The luck-component argument can be made under decision-theoretic risk, uncertainty and ignorance.
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5 Discussion
It has been argued here that an apology may be morally fitting or required in case of correct
risk analysis, but it cannot be an authentic one. This holds when uncertainties about one’s
blameworthiness remain, when one has induced a moral wrong which is justified all things
considered, when one has faced a tragic choice, and/or possibly also when there are pragmatic
moral reasons that warrant apologizing. If a moral remainder has not been fulfilled, an
authentic apology may be required, but it is not concerned directly with the original (risk)
decision. Furthermore, three lines of arguments which threaten to undermine the possibility of
correct risk analysis have been highlighted. Even if these arguments went through and if
correct risk analysis (as defined at the outset) was impossible, stating a post-accident apology
remains weird when everything that could have reasonably been done was in fact done pre-
accident.
On the one hand, I hope I have showed how analysis of post-accident apologizing can shed
new light on vexed tensions in ethical assessment of risk impositions. The preceding analysis
indicates that bringing different discussions of moral blameworthiness together facilitates
resolving the tensions. It also calls for further and early-on collaboration between risk theorists
and ethicists in order to carry these insights to risk analysis. On the other hand, I have argued
here that analysis of risk decisions, in part, reveals a discrepancy between the definitional work
done on apology and what is required by ethics. The analysis highlighted different kinds of
cases in which nobody is culpable, but an apology can yet be morally fitting or even required.
While authentic apology presupposes moral blameworthiness, it would be nonsensical to say
that in these cases one ought to apologize, but in a disingenuous manner.
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